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34th Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists (EGRIE) 17 - 19 September 2007 Cologne

European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003743533

A dynamic analysis of the demand for health care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; Klaauw, Bas van der - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003762648

Adverse selection with frequency and severity risk : alternative risk-sharing provisions

Ligon, James Allen; Thistle, Paul D. - In: The journal of risk and insurance : the journal of the … 75 (2008) 4, pp. 825-846

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003790350

Loss coverage as a public policy objective for risk classification schemes

Thomas, R. Guy - In: The journal of risk and insurance : the journal of the … 75 (2008) 4, pp. 997-1018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003790370

Genetic testing and adverse selection

MacMinn, Richard D.; Brockett, Patrick L. - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002112066

Risk selection and complementary health insurance : the Swiss approach

Kifmann, Mathias - In: International journal of health care finance and economics 6 (2006) 2, pp. 151-170

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003344045

Background risk and the performance of insurance markets under adverse selection

Crocker, Keith J.; Snow, Arthur - In: The Geneva risk and insurance review 33 (2008) 2, pp. 137-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003791154

Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk

Alary, David (contributor); Bien, F. (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003795951

Mortality heterogeneity and life insurance

Hoermann, Gudrun - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003884144

Insurance markets with differential information

Seog, S. Hun - In: The journal of risk and insurance : the journal of the … 76 (2009) 2, pp. 279-294

This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. I find that low-general-risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003868622