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Bose, Gautam - 2010

This review attempts to identify treatments of corruption that draw upon characteristics of underdevelopment either as … causes or as consequences. It focuses on three aspects of corruption in developing economies: red tape, rent-seeking, and the … the structure of corruption markets …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044704

The anti-corruption campaign and the inter-generational transmission of working in bureaucracy : evidence from China

Chen, Shuai; Ge, Erqi - 2022

those without. Using the recent anti-corruption campaign in China as a quasi-experiment, we investigate how endeavors for … counter-corruption affect inequality and potential cronyism in bureaucratic employment through inter-generational transmission …. First, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis to compare changes in the probability of working in bureaucracy after …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013358054

Measurements, Determinants and Causes of Corruption : Lessons from China's Anti-Corruption Campaign

Fang, Hanming - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

Corruption is a widespread phenomenon in many developing and transitional economies. China is a country in profile both … in the prevalence of corruption, and in its attempts to root out corruption. The recent anti-corruption campaign in China …. It has had lasting impact on the functioning of the Chinese bureaucracy, and on the behavior of firms and consumers. It …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014287377

Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency : Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics

Wawrosz, Petr; Otáhal, Tomáš - 2013

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption … accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent … from the early period of transition in the Czech and Slovak Republics to support the implication that the corruption …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165228

Contests among bureaucrats

Bös, Dieter - 2002

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514012

Political alignment and bureaucratic pay

Fiva, Jon H.; Geys, Benny; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; … - 2019

We study the private gains to bureaucrats from their political alignment with elected politicians. Whereas existing studies generally rely on proxies for politician-bureaucrat political alignment, a rare feature of our data allows measuring it directly since 27% of bureaucrats ran for political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012119821

Economic regulations, red tape, and bureaucratic corruption in post-communist economies

Duvanova, Dinissa - In: World development : the multi-disciplinary … 59 (2014), pp. 298-312

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010416383

Four riders of the apocalypse of the Polish bureaucracy

Kieżun, Witold - In: Foundations of Management : the journal of Warsaw … 10 (2018) 1, pp. 7-12

This article was originally published in Polish as: Witold Kieżun, Czterej jeźdźcy apokalipsy polskiej biurokracji, Kultura, No. 3/630, Paris 2000. The Literary Institute (publisher of the “Kultura” monthly) expressed its interest in and consent to the publication of an English-language...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856537

Insulation or patronage : political institutions and bureaucratic efficiency

Mueller, Hannes - In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy 15 (2015) 3, pp. 961-996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011428051

Endogenous Institutions in Bureaucratic Compliance Games

Santoni, Michele; Fedeli, Silvia - 2004

We consider a set-up where two governments have either conflicting or matching preferences on the provision of differentiated (local) goods supplied by a common monopoly bureau. We develop a two-stage game. At stage-1, the two governments decide whether or not to merge into a single institution....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068504