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We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by [MV07.a], and we exemplify them in the case of truly combinatorial auctions.We benchmark the combined performance (the sum of the auction's efficiency and revenue) of a truly combinatorial auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009433265
We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by [MV07.a], and we exemplify them in the case of truly combinatorial auctions.We benchmark the combined performance (the sum of the auction's effciency and revenue)of a truly combinatorial auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009433266
Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove that a strategy of an extensive game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this process iteratively eliminates conditionally dominated strategies according to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599478
Collecting and processing large amounts of data is becoming increasingly crucialin our society. We model this task as evaluating a function f over a large vector x =(x1,...,xn), which is unknown, but drawn from a publicly known distribution X. In our model, learning each component of the input x...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010036
In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other's valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709899
Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited andlegally prosecuted. Yet, colluders have always existed, and may continue to exist. We thus raise the followingquestion for mechanism design:What desiderata are achievable, and by what type of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009432429
Privacy and trust affect our everyday thinking and, in particular, the way we approach a concrete game. Accordingly, we hope that a rigorous treatment of privacy and trust will become integral part of mechanism design. As of now, the field has been very successful in finding many ingenious...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009432430
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