Credit rating agencies play a crucial role in financial markets. There are two competing views regarding their behavior: some argue that they engage in rating inflation, while others suggest that they deflate ratings. This article offers a rationale that reconciles the two opposite arguments. We...

In the recent decade, emerging economies are rising, in which BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and more recently South Africa) have distinguished themselves with their rapid development to lead the tide of the world. Investigating the exceeding development plans, policies, path selections....

A monopolist who originally charges a uniform price across all markets may switch to discriminatory pricing upon the entry of a competitor. As a result, intensified competition may lead to more dispersed prices as well as higher prices for some or all consumers.

We analyse R&D cooperation between product‐market competitors within a repeated‐game framework with imperfect monitoring. When firms are patient enough, R&D cooperation is attainable without product‐market collusion. However, if firms are less patient, we show that collusion in the product...

Successful upstream collusion must satisfy both the incentive constraint (keeping cartel members in line) and the compensation constraint (preventing lawsuits from downstream firms). Our analysis shows that there is a non-monotonic and inverted U-shaped relationship between cartel incidence and...

In a general equilibrium framework, it is known that imitation may actually promote innovation (Aghion et al., 1997). The same effect is demonstrated with a standard oligopoly model in which one firm has the ability to develop technologies while all other firms imitate and obtain a fraction of...

A monopolist who originally charges a uniform price across all markets may switch to discriminatory pricing upon the entry of a competitor. As a result, intensified competition may lead to more dispersed prices as well as higher prices for some or all consumers.

This research introduces the sequential bargaining to the standard screening model by allowing the agent to propose new contracts with strategic delay after the rejection of the principal's offer. We have found that if the difference between the types of agent are sufficiently large, the...