We consider financial networks where agents are linked to each other with financial contracts. A centralized clearing mechanism collects the initial endowments, the liabilities and the division rules of the agents and determines the payments to be made. A division rule specifies how the assets...

A firm has liabilities towards a group of creditors. We analyze the question of how to distribute the asset value of the firm among the creditors and the firm itself. Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game theory literature, we introduce the firm as an explicit player and...

Risk allocation games are cooperative games that are used to attribute the risk of a financial entity to its divisions. In this paper, we extend the literature on risk allocation games by incorporating liquidity considerations. A liquidity policy specifies state-dependent liquidity requirements...

We extend the theoretical model of external corporate financing to the case when the buyers of the borrowing firm may default during the financing period. In our setup there is an asymmetric information and hence moral hazard between the lender and the borrower concerning the effrts of the...

This book is a tutorial guide for new users that aims to help you understand the basics of and become accomplished with the use of R for quantitative finance.If you are looking to use R to solve problems in quantitative finance, then this book is for you. A basic knowledge of financial theory is...

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to...

A pénzügyekben mind elméletileg, mind az alkalmazások szempontjából fontos kérdés a tőkeallokáció. Hogyan osszuk szét egy adott portfólió kockázatát annak alportfóliói között? Miként tartalékoljunk tőkét a fennálló kockázatok fedezetére, és a tartalékokat hogyan...