We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...

Several game theoretical topics require the analysis of hierarchical beliefs, particularly in incomplete information situations. For the problem of incomplete information, Hars´anyi suggested the concept of the type space. Later Mertens & Zamir gave a construction of such a type space under...

Egy kooperatív játék megoldása az egyes játékosok által együttesen elérhető eredmény bizonyos elvek szerinti elosztása a játékosok között. Egy regressziós modellben a rendelkezésre álló magyarázó változók által együttesen elérhető illeszkedés az az eredmény, amit...

Meier (2012) gave a "mathematical logic foundation" of the purely measurable universal type space (Heifetz and Samet, 1998). The mathematical logic foundation, however, discloses an inconsistency in the type space literature: a finitary language is used for the belief hierarchies and an...

In this note we present a cardinally convex game (Sharkey, 1981) with empty core. Sharkey assumes that V (N) is convex, we do not do so, hence we do not contradict Sharkey's result.

Meier (2008) shows that the universal knowledge-belief space exists. However, besides the universality there is an other important property might be imposed on knowledge- belief spaces, inherited also from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper we introduce the notion of complete...

We give a new proof of Young's characterization of the Shapley value. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value is valid on various well-known subclasses of TU games.

Taking advantage of ambiguity in strategic situations is well documented in the literature. However, so far there are only few results on how to make ambiguous strategies. In this paper we introduce a procedure which makes objective ambiguity, concretely it draws an element from a set of priors,...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced. This finding generalizes Schmeidler...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem for infinite TU games with and without restricted cooperation, to the cases where the core consists of...