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Despite evidence that modern democracies systematically shortchange public investment goods, relatively little theoretical work exists to explain this phenomenon. We build on Baron and Ferejohn's (American Political Science Review, 83(4) (1989) 1181--1206) bargaining model to describe public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014140583
legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318840
agent. We provide empirical support for our theoretical predictions by means of a laboratory experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997748
different voting rules when there is the opportunity of logrolling. We have carried out 3 experiments and compare our findings … with the standard public choice theory predictions. In the first experiment we have shown that in a situation of 3-issues … cases does not arise. In experiment 2 we have shown that the adoption of the unanimity, instead of the majority, rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506640
A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015019
. -- formal sanctions ; informal sanctions ; experiment ; voting ; cooperation ; punishment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008908893
experimental results for the plurality voting scheme. -- efficiency ; experiments ; mechanism design ; public project ; uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003720837
Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self‐interest should produce a sub‐optimal outcome absent sanctions for non‐cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130732
Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization. We study a collective action dilemma in which self-interest should produce a sub-optimal outcome absent sanctions for non-cooperation. We then test experimentally whether subjects make the theoretically optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186288
This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457362