In this paper we revise the probabilistic foundations of the theory of the measurement of 'voting power' either as success or decisiveness. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting procedure and the voters' behavior. We propose a simple model in...

Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decision makers who use it. In order to test and compare them, some authors have proposed "natural" postulates that a measure of a priori voting power "should" satisfy, the violations of which are...

In this paper, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are...

This paper deals with the assessment of inequality in the distribution of voting power. As voting procedures are modeled as simple games and power evaluated through power indices, two approaches are possible to deal with inequality in this context, depending on whether the power profiles...

In this paper we measure the effect of the quota on the difficulty of making decisions in the EU-25 Council with the weights agreed upon in the Treaty of Nice. We compute the probability of a proposal being rejected in the Council. This probability depends on the voting rule (and therefore on...