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In the long-run we are all dead: On the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Mannheim - 2012
We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833242
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In the long-run we are all dead : on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - 2012
We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489806
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In the long-run we are all dead : on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments ; conference paper
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - 2013
We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher cooperation, if (i) there is a sufficiently long time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343787
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Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Noussair, Charles N.; Wilkening, Tom - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2011
A normative conflict arises when there exist multiple plausible norms of behavior. In such cases, norm enforcement can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917760
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Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Noussair, Charles N.; Wilkening, Tom - In: Journal of Public Economics 96 (2012) 9-10, pp. 797-807
A normative conflict arises when multiple plausible rules exist, specifying how one ought to behave in a given situation. In such cases, enforcing one normative rule can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608540
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In the long-run we are all dead : on the benefits of peer punishment in rich environments
Engelmann, Dirk; Nikiforakis, Nikos - In: Social choice and welfare 45 (2015) 3, pp. 561-577
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392377
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Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment
Nikiforakis, Nikos; Engelmann, Dirk - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
Punishing free riders might promote cooperation, but it can also lead to feuds. We use a public good game with … punishment opportunities to investigate whether the threat of feuds is e¢ ciency enhancing. Treatments di¤er with respect to … feuds. While the possibility of a feud a¤ects punishment and contribution patterns, total earnings are not signi?cantly di …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574884
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Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions
Balafoutas, Loukas; Grechenig, Kristoffel; Nikiforakis, … - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 308-310
This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743720
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Cooperation and punishment under uncertain enforcement
Sousa, Sergio - 2010
This paper investigates the efficacy of a punishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Experimental studies have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt behaviour deemed as socially acceptable....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277489
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Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments
Nikiforakis, Nikos - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 2008
A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the e¢ cacy of punishment. Providing subjects with infor- mation about the earnings of their peers leads to lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005458710