This paper is a first step towards a better understanding of the role of multilateral meetings in modern monetary models. We apply the implementability approach to a model à la Lagos and Wright. In the original model, periodic access to the centralized market (i.e., one multilateral meeting...

The authors introduce an element of centralization in a random matching model of money that allows for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange. Some agents, which the authors identify as banks, are endowed with the technology to issue notes and to record-keep reserves with a...

We show that price stickiness is predicted by the theory of second best, applied to a random- matching model of money. The economy is hit with iid, aggregate, preference shocks, and allocations are allowed to be history dependent. Due to individual anonymity and lack of commitment, implementable...

Should monetary policy be cyclical? The debate around this question is old but has benefited very little from research on the pure theory of money. In our model, people trade in pairs, without double coincidence of wants and face seasonal fluctuations. Monetary policy is restricted to taxing...

We describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one which is difficult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random-matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not efficient to...

We introduce an element of centralization in a random matching model of money that allows for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange. Some agents, which we identify as banks, are endowed with the technology to issue notes and to record-keep reserves with a central clearinghouse,...