We extend the Benassy (1996) 'taste for variety' model to an open economy setting. With the Benassy effect, the market equilibrium is inefficient, openness reduces the varieties provided in the unconstrained optimum and there are potential gains from international coordination.

We present a model of transnational terrorism where two countries, home and foreign, face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country chooses how much to invest in defending itself or in reducing terrorist resources either indirectly by subsidising the foreign country or by...

There are two main sources of information about the Arms Trade, SIPRI and ACDA. These two sources give very different pictures of the evolution of the market, primarily because their measures are designed to capture conceptually different features. Although they are both expressed in constant...

The possibility of domestic production raises a difficulty for arms export control measures, since embargoes, by raising the effective price of imports, increase the incentive for domestic production. We address this issue by developing a partial equilibrium model of the international arms...

Given that there are a relatively small number of suppliers of major weapons systems, control fo arms exports is possible, and there are a variety of regulatory regimes striving to achieve this. Controls can stabilize regional arms races and reduce tensions. However, when buyers can develop the...

We present a model of transnational terrorism where two countries, home and foreign, face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country chooses how much to invest in defending itself or in reducing terrorist resources either indirectly by subsidising the foreign country or by...

In this paper, we construct a model of market structure in the global arms industry linking concentration, military procurement, international trade and regional conflict. We show how concentration depends on the willingness of producers to import for their military needs and on the relative...

We consider conflicts between an incumbent, e.g. government or dominant firm, and potential challengers, e.g. guerilla movement or entrants. It is not uncommon for challengers to win such conflicts despite their lack of resources. They can do this by exploiting a second mover advantage: choosing...