, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts … provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …

, fairness and incentives. …We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of … contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become …

actually pay the announced bonus. This offers a new explanation for why explicit and implicit incentives are substitutes rather …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerful … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …

, fairness and incentives. …We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of … contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerful … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerful … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …

-interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness. …

, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives. …We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts … provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But …