We examine a model of suppliers selling to two segments of consumers, who have different preferences for quality (or some product characteristic). We show that if the firm is unable to price discriminate between the segments, then there is less investment in quality. We find that both consumer...

We show that a monopolist's problem of optimal advance selling strategy can be mathematically transformed into a problem of optimal bundling strategy if four conditions hold: i. consumers and the firm agree on the probability of the states occurring, ii. the firm pre-commits to the spot prices...

We show that bundling and advance selling are equivalent when the consumers and the seller agree on the probability of each possible state of nature occurring and are risk-neutral, and when the seller can pre-commit to spot prices to be charged after the uncertainty about the state of nature is...

We examine the role of reservations in capacity-constrained services with a focus on restaurants. Although customers value reservations, restaurants typically neither charge for them nor impose penalties for failing to keep them. However, reservations impose costs on firms offering them. We...

Monopolists selling complementary products charge a higher price in a static equilibrium than a single multiproduct monopolist would, reducing both the industry profits and consumer surplus. However, firms could instead reach a Pareto improvement by lowering prices to the single monopolist...