Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, which is inconsistent with the 'race to the bottom' in capital standards found in the literature. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give...

Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, thus suggesting a "race to the top" in capital standards. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give loans to firms that produce output in...

Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, which is inconsistent with the 'race to the bottom' in capital standards found in the literature. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give...

Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, thus suggesting a 'race to the top' in capital standards. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give loans to firms that produce output in...

Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, thus suggesting a "race to the top" in capital standards. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give loans to firms that produce output in...

This paper studies regulatory competition in the banking sector in a model where banks are heterogeneous and taxpayers come up for the losses of failing banks. Capital requirements force the weakest banks to exit the market. This gives rise to a signalling effect of capital standards, as...

The lack of coordination in the resolution of multinational banks has led to demands for the increased centralization of resolution regimes. However, as this paper argues, the anticipation of resolution procedures affects the incentives of host countries to impose capital standards on their...

The lack of coordination in the resolution of multinational banks has led to demands for the increased centralization of resolution regimes. However, as this paper argues, the anticipation of resolution procedures affects the incentives of host countries to impose capital standards on their...

We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporates a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the risk of default outweighs the cost advantages of...

We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporate a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the risk of default outweighs the cost advantages of...