We analyze an all-pay group contest problem in which individual members' efforts are aggregated via the best-shot technology and the prize is a public good for the winning group. The interplay of within-group free-riding and across-group competition allows for a wide variety of equilibria,...

The achievements of a group frequently depend on the efforts of just a few members but represent a public good benefit to all members. This paper investigates such a situation: the private provision of a public good whose level is determined as the maximum effort made by a group member. Members'...

We study group competition with a single public good prize, perfectly discriminating contest success function, and the weakest-link effort technology, in which the marginal cost of effort for each player is private information. We focus on pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria and show that...

In sequential contests between ex-ante symmetric players, the outcome of early battles creates an asymmetry in players' incentives to expend resources, which undermines future expenditures. This dynamic force is absent in simultaneous contests, and consequently expenditures in sequential...

We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not meet a threshold set by the seller of the good. We provide a general characterization of symmetric equilibrium strategies that are continuous...