The achievements of a group frequently depend on the efforts of just a few members but represent a public good benefit to all members. This paper investigates such a situation: the private provision of a public good whose level is determined as the maximum effort made by a group member. Members'...

Excessively tight and biased policy choices of rule makers can be explained as outcomes of competition among rule makers with over-lapping competencies and diverging perceptions about the optimal framework. Rule makers who have extreme rather than moderate preferences are more likely to take...

We study the sorting of contestants across Tullock contests, and the allocation of a prize budget across these contests. Our benchmark result is that total effort is maximized by a unique grand contest and contestant exclusions decrease total effort. We consider two extensions of our benchmark...

We explore public randomization (Harris et al., 1995) in group contests and introduce group public randomization equilibria (GPRE). We consider group all-pay auctions with weakest-link and best-shot impact functions. While best-shot contests without public randomization are known for their...

We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique...

We introduce threshold uncertainty, a la Nitzan and Romano (1990), into a private-values model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. Players are allowed to make any level of contribution toward funding the good, which is provided only if the cost threshold is reached. Otherwise,...

We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not meet a threshold set by the seller of the good. We provide a general characterization of symmetric equilibrium strategies that are continuous...