We present a model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines marketdiscipline on traditional banks. Depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crisesimposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safeportfolio strategy to prevent early...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors’ preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...

Stress-tests provide complementary information about banks’ risk exposures. Recent empirical evidence, however, has uncovered potential inaccuracies in stress-test based assessments. We investigate the regulatory implications of these inaccuracies. Without stress-tests, the regulator cannot...

This article derives a model of self-regulation where banks issue insurance products to hedge their leverage ratio. This approach is an alternative policy to Basel regulation for controlling systemic risk without increasing equity level. We show some conditions under which the model can be...

This paper proposes a standardised classification of business models of the European Union (EU) banks. Our work is based on a rich and unique dataset collected for the first time for the full population of EU banks at individual level. The proposed approach to classification combines both a...

The analysis highlights the aspects of diversified market structures and of local, low-distance banking as advantageous for financial stability. Heterogeneity protects from uniform market behaviour. Local banking can better overcome the problem of asymmetric information, particular in SME...

We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary...

We analyze the effect of bank capital requirements on the structure and risk of a financial system where markets, regulated banks, and shadow banks coexist. Banks face a moral hazard problem in screening entrepreneurs' projects, and they choose whether to be regulated or not. If regulated, a...

In March 2012 a conference, organised jointly by the ICFR and SUERF, on "Future Risks and Fragilities for Financial Stability", explored what the next pressure points for financial stability might be, how these may arise from the response to the last financial crisis, and how the industry and...

We quantify the gains from regulating banks' maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic...