This paper seeks to expand on two topical strands in Government Finance and Political Science literature, rent-seeking and the soft-budget constraint, so as to bring forth a strong linkage with corporate governance environments. It will attempt to accomplish this task by setting up a distinctive...

In this paper, a formal rent-seeking theory of the firm is developed. The main idea is that integration (compared to non-integration) facilitates rent-seeking for the integrating party, but makes it harder for the integrated one. In a one-period model, this implies that the rent-seeking contest...

I analyze how ownership can be structured to minimize the haggling costs due to contractual incompleteness. I model haggling as a contest in which integration gives the integrating party a relative advantage over the integrated party. In a one-period model, this implies that the contest will...

We are concerned with the design of a constitution for a firm - an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control (and possibly residual income rights) without reference to the issue to be decided. We focus attention on two polar constitutions: non-profit cooperatives and outside...

After the collapse of communism, political elites in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) implemented economic reforms that were largely inspired by the prevailing neoliberal paradigm. One of the consequences of these reforms was that the region's economies became very open to foreign direct...

In The Visible Hand (1977) and subsequent works, Alfred Chandler chronicled the rise of the large vertically integrated corporation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On one reading, The Visible Hand is about the response of business institutions to the conditions of a...

Drawing inspiration from American institutionalism and new institutional economics, this paper discusses the rise of large corporate farms as the transition from the classic capitalist firm to the corporate form of organization based on the separation of ownership and control. Three case studies...

This paper introduces the theory of firm organization under moral hazard into an equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous talents and technologies. The model is able to explain how the allocation of power and the provision of financial incentives inside firms varies within and...

Recent years have witnessed an enormous amount of reorganization of the corporate sector in the US and in Europe. This paper examines the role of market competition for this trend in corporate reorganization. We find that at intermediate levels of competition the CEO of the corporation decides...

Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance does not add groundbreaking new insights to the relevant debate or deliberate extensively on the most recent developments. Bringing together most of the trend-setting articles in a slightly revised form in a concise volume, however, serves an...