We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize...

Perfectly discriminating contests (or all pay auction) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their ability to fight in the contest. This paper studies a two...

In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock's rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength...

The United States is unique in that most states select their prosecutors using popular election. An interesting feature of prosecutor elections is that the pool of potential challengers to an incumbent comes primarily from subordinates within the office. We develop a signaling model that...

We study information disclosure and diversification in contests with technological uncertainty, where agents can pursue different technologies to compete in the contest, but there is uncertainty regarding which will be implemented ex post. The principal can credibly reveal some information about...