In firms with multiple blockholders governance via exit is affected by how blockholders react to each others' exit. Institutional investors, who hold the majority of equity blocks, are heterogeneous in their incentives. How do these incentives affect the manner in which institutional...

In a model with correlated and interdependent values/costs, we identify for the buyer's bid double auction the asymptotic distributions of the price and of two order statistics in the first order conditions for optimal bidding/asking, all of which are normal. The asymptotic distribution of price...

We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers, each of whom wishes to buy at most one item, and m sellers, each of whom has one item to sell. The traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms for trading are considered. The buyer's bid...

A regulator who designs a public stress test to avert default of a distressed bank via private investment must account for large investors' private information on the bank's state. We provide conditions for crowding-in (crowding-out) so that the regulator offers more (less) information to...

We investigate the effect of the ability of \non-traditional" funds to short-sell the equity of their debtors. This enables the funds to vote on the restructuring proposals of distressed firms, while at the same time they separate their voting rights from their economic exposure. The effect on...