that optimal government policy depends on the dispersion and skewness of the firms' productivity distribution. … low- and high-productivity firms. By introducing a declining time profile of benefits, the government can affect the … equilibrium wage profile in a manner that enhances the sorting of workers across low- and high-productivity firms. We demonstrate …

that optimal government policy depends on the dispersion and skewness of the firms' productivity distribution. … low- and high-productivity firms. By introducing a declining time profile of benefits, the government can affect the … equilibrium wage profile in a manner that enhances the sorting of workers across low- and high-productivity firms. We demonstrate …

that optimal government policy depends on the dispersion and skewness of the firms’ productivity distribution. … low- and high-productivity firms. By introducing a declining time profile of benefits, the government can affect the … equilibrium wage profile in a manner that enhances the sorting of workers across low- and high-productivity firms. We demonstrate …

that optimal government policy depends on the dispersion and skewness of the firms' productivity distribution … low- and high-productivity firms. By introducing a declining time profile of benefits, the government can affect the … equilibrium wage profile in a manner that enhances the sorting of workers across low- and high-productivity firms. We demonstrate …

We construct a multi-sector search and matching model where the unemployed receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks … unemployment benefits — productivity insurance while unemployed. Analytically, we characterize two competing effects of benefits on … productivity, a moral hazard effect and a consumption effect. In a stylized quantitative analysis, we show that the consumption …

Ein Instrument zur Eindämmung von Moral Hazard in der Arbeitslosenversicherung ist die finanzielle Sanktion in Form …