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Equity Incentives and Earnings Management : Evidence from the Banking Industry
Cheng, Qiang; Warfield, Terry; Ye, Minlei - 2013
regulation on earnings management arising from CEOs' equity incentives. We find that bank managers with high equity incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014211466
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Illegal insider trading and corporate governance
Ajit, D.; Donker, Han; Ivanof, Mike - In: International journal of corporate governance : IJCG 5 (2014) 1/2, pp. 1-21
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010469748
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Abandon ship : inside debt and risk-taking incentives in bad times
Cambrea, Domenico Rocco; Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, … - 2016 - This draft: December 13, 2016
delivers two predictions. First, managers have an incentive to reduce the correlation between inside debt and company stock in … bad times. Second, managers that reduce such a correlation take on more risk in bad times. Using a sample of U.S. public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572771
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Taxes and the backdating of stock option exercise dates
Dhaliwal, Dan S.; Erickson, Merle M.; Heitzman, Shane - In: Journal of accounting & economics 47 (2009) 1/2, pp. 27-49
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003821595
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On the benefits of allowing CEOs to time their stock option exercises
Laux, Volker - In: The Rand journal of economics 41 (2010) 1, pp. 118-138
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974284
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Why do investors react negatively to seasoned equity offerings?
Kim, Ŭng-han (contributor);  … - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003746297
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Vorstandsvergütung mit Aktienoptionen : Sicherung der Anreizkompatibilität als gesellschaftsrechtliche Gestaltungsaufgabe
Korn, Bettina - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001421028
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Information, Insider Trading, Executive Reload Stock Options, Incentives, and Regulation
Colwell, David B. - 2020
We introduce a theoretical model of executives with insider information who receive executive stock options (ESOs) as incentives and optimize their “outside wealth” portfolios. We show that insider information nullifies ESO incentivizing, misaligning executives' and shareholders' interests....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850239
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Beliefs-dependent utilities do influence firm-specific wealth (executives' inside equity holdings)
Alsheikh, Muna Ibrahim - In: Journal of economics & business 109 (2020), pp. 1-14
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244925