Investors' return expectations are pivotal in stock markets, but the reasoning behind these expectations remains a black box for economists. This paper sheds light on economic agents' mental models - their subjective understanding - of the stock market, drawing on surveys with the US general...

Investors’ return expectations are pivotal in stock markets, but the reasoning behind these expectations remains a black box for economists. This paper sheds light on economic agents’ mental models – their subjective understanding – of the stock market, drawing on surveys with the US...

We show that mutual funds use information acquired by participating in the equity lending market to make portfolio allocation decisions. Using data from German mutual funds on their stock-level lending decisions, we find that funds lending shares are more likely to exit positions relative both...

Abstract I demonstrate an important tension between acquiring information and incorporating it into asset prices. As a salient case, I analyze the rise of algorithmic trading (AT), which is typically associated with improved price efficiency. Using a new measure of the information content of...

The collection of information necessary fordecision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats,advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision haveto be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of asingle agent. The reason is that two conflicting pieces...

I analyze a monopolistic model of quality uncertainty but with the possibility of information acquisition on the consumer side. Information is costly and its amount is chosen by the consumer. The analysis of Bayesian equilibria shows the possibility of three equilibrium classes, only one of...

We study the interaction between productive investment and persuasion activities in a principal-agent setting with strategic disclosure. In an attempt to persuade the principal, the agent diverts substantial resources from productive activities to information acquisition for persuasion, even...

I study the optimal incentive provision in a principal–agent relationship with costly information acquisition by the agent. I emphasize that adverse selection or moral hazard is the principal's endogenous choice by inducing or deterring information acquisition. The principal designs the...

We study a decision process of a two-agent organization that consists of a decision-maker who selects a project and an implementer who implements and executes the selected project. Each of the decision-maker and the implementer has intrinsic and possibly divergent preferences over projects. Key...