We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about voters' preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus...

This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed...

In this paper we propose a model with uncertainty in which strategic voters vote, under poportional rule, for a Parliament and parties bargain to form a government. We prove that only consensus government form and only extreme parties take votes

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. But this...

This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed...