This paper builds a general oligopolistic equilibrium model to investigate how within-sector firm heterogeneities affect wage rate, country-wide profits, and welfare. Using linear inverse demands, I consider asymmetric sectors, each involving n Cournot oligopolists producing horizontally...

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

In this paper we show that a homogeneous-product market with multiple Bertrand equilibria becomes a market with a single Bertrand equilibrium when we introduce a small degree of product differentiation. When differentiation tends to zero, that Bertrand equilibrium converges to the unique...

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete a la Cournot, then they are able to sustain quot;collusivequot; outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By...

We provide an extensive and general investigation of the effects on industryperformance - profits, social welfare and price-cost margins - of exogenously changing the number of firms in Cournot markets. This includes an in-depth exploration of the well-known trade-off between competition and...

We consider the issue of first versus second-mover advantage in differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs. We generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and/or complements, dispensing with...