We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …

-Agent Theory (BPAT), a great deal of modern regulation can be helpfully evaluated as a hypothetical delegation. Shifting from … words, government serves as our agent. Understood in light of Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) and Behavioral Principal …

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …

We discuss a government's incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade-off in its … and the firm's private information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation. Furthermore, we discuss how … that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift. Because of the nature of the regulation problem, the effect …