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Chapter 13. Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics

Sandholm, William H. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 703-778). 2015

Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents occasionally receiving opportunities to switch strategies, basing their choices on simple myopic rules called revision protocols...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025446

Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics

Sandholm, William H. - Elsevier

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255427

Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

Katsikas, Stamatios; Kolokoltsov, Vassili; Yang, Wei - In: Games 7 (2016) 4, pp. 1-25

We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550602

Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences

Robles, Jack - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 35 (2008) 1, pp. 19-36

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003633992

Strategies of survival in dynamic asset market games

Amir, Rabah; Evstigneev, Igor V.; Xu, Le - 2008

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of a financial market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and partially reinvested. The traders use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules), distributing their wealth between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003966195

Evolutionary game theory : an exposition

Lahkar, Ratul - In: Indian growth and development review 5 (2012) 2, pp. 203-213

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009669460

Imitation dynamics with payoff shocks

Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Viossat, Yannick - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 45 (2016) 1/2, pp. 291-320

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011554676

Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

Wallace, Christopher; Young, H. Peyton - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498303

Chapter 6. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Wallace, Chris; Young, H. Peyton - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 327-380). 2015

Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. Evolutionary game theory differs in two key respects: the focus is on large populations of individuals who interact at random rather than on small numbers of players; and individuals are assumed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025453

Strategic teaching and learning in games

Schipper, Burkhard - 2015

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516648

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