We investigate whether a welfare-maximizing government ought to pursue a program of" strategic trade intervention or instead commit itself to free trade when domestic firms will have an opportunity to manipulate the government's choice of the level of" intervention. Domestic firms may overinvest...

This paper argues that export subsidies aimed at shifting rents from foreign to domestic producers of a final good may also serve to shift rents to foreign firms supplying an intermediate good, weakening the incentive for the subsidy. By contrast, assuming Cournot competition for both the final...

This paper studies the effect of production subsidies used as strategic instruments by two rivalling countries whose firms differ in production efficiency. In particular, it examines the welfare effects of a uniform subsidy reduction from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium under different assumptions...

In a three-country model in which export countries adopt environmental policies, this note analyses how abatement ("green") subsidy can become a potential strategic trade policy tool. When governments set the optimal policy tool considering their local environmental damages, a rich set of...

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R & D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home...