We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greater resources wins. In...

Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, me rger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare – improving even if costs are linear. The...

Kai Konrad bestätigt und verstärkt in seinem Kommentar die Kernthesen von Joachim Weimann. Er nimmt insbesondere Stellung zur Frage einseitiger Vorleistungen. Er referiert auch neuere Ergebnisse, die zeigen, dass solche Vorleistungen nicht nur zu einer internationalen Verlagerung der...

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we...