We construct a two-country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken sequentially by private producers and the public sector. We characterize the Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and...

We construct a two-country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken by both private producers and the public sector. We characterize Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and funds...

This paper is the first attempt to explore the impact of interest groups and transboundary pollution on the welfare effects of pollution taxes and pollution standards in the framework of strategic environmental policies. The main findings of this paper are as follows. First, without interest...

This paper is the first attempt to explore the impact of interest groups and transboundary pollution on the welfare effects of pollution taxes and pollution standards in the framework of strategic environmental policies. The main findings of this paper are as follows. First, without interest...

This paper considers a trade situation where the production activities of potentially heterogeneous countries generate pollution which can cross borders and harm the well-being of all the countries involved. In each of those countries the policy market levies pollution taxes on the polluting...