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We study the monotonicity properties of solutions in the classic problem of fair cake-cutting - dividing a single heterogeneous resource among agents with subjective utilities. Resource and population-monotonicity relate to scenarios where the cake, or the number of participants who divide the...
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The group identification literature mostly revolves around the problem of identifying individuals in the community who belong to groups with ethnic or religious identity. Here we use the same model framework to identify individuals who play key role in some sense. In particular we will focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345023
The classic fair cake-cutting problem [Steinhaus, 1948] is extended by introducing geometric constraints on the allocated pieces. Specifically, agents may demand to get their share as a square or a rectangle with a bounded length/width ratio. This is a plausible constraint in realistic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734294
In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n = 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n≥3 it requires that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this property recently suggested by Troyan and Morril, called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014284464
The classic fair cake-cutting problem [Steinhaus, 1948] is extended by introducing geometric constraints on the allocated pieces. Specifically, agents may demand to get their share as a square or a rectangle with a bounded length/width ratio. This is a plausible constraint in realistic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336034
Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We nd that envy-free procedures, in particular Selfridge-Conway, are fairer and also are perceived as fairer than their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946257
In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n = 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n Ï 3 it requires that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this property recently suggested by Troyan and Morril, called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142186
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