This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...

This paper studies the problem of delegating the allocation of resources across multiple categories to an agent who has better information on their benefits. It focuses on a tractable, natural class of delegation policies that impose a floor or cap on the allocation to each category, a...

Evidence from various choice domains shows that the presentation order of the attributes of the available options can have important effects on decisions. We introduce a decision-theoretic model that allows for such effects. We identify simple properties of observable behavior that characterize...

Personal data is an essential input for the digital economy. Yet, individuals often have limited control over its use and are rarely compensated for it. What inefficiencies does this status quo generate? Which market institutions could improve upon it? We study the competitive equilibria of an...

Many online platforms intermediate trade between sellers and buyers relying on individual data records of their personal characteristics. Is one buyer's record more valuable than another? How much is each worth and why? After formulating this intermediation as an information-design problem, we...