We analyze optimal capital and labor taxes in a model where (i) the government makes noncontingent announcements about future policies and (ii) ex-post statecontingent deviations from these announcements are costly. With Full Commitment, optimal fiscal announcements are unbiased forecasts of...

We propose a theory of optimal fiscal policy consistent with the observation that governments typically inherit their predecessors' plans and formulate their policies over a finite future horizon. We use this framework, which we call “Limited-Time Commitment" (LTC), to make two contributions....

We consider models where the Ramsey-optimal fiscal policy under Full Commitment (FC) is time-inconsistent and define a new notion of optimal policy, Limited-Time Commitment (LTC). Successive one-period lived governments can commit to future plans over a finite horizon. We provide a sufficient...

We consider models where the Ramsey-optimal fiscal policy under Full Commitment (FC) is time-inconsistent and define a new notion of optimal policy, Limited-Time Commitment (LTC). Successive one-period lived governments can commit to future plans over a finite horizon. We provide a sufficient...

We analyze optimal capital and labor taxes in a model where (i) the government makes noncontingent announcements about future policies and (ii) ex-post statecontingent deviations from these announcements are costly. With Full Commitment, optimal fiscal announcements are unbiased forecasts of...

We analyze optimal capital and labor taxes in a model where (i) the government makes noncontingent announcements about future policies and (ii) ex-post state-contingent deviations from these announcements are costly. With Full Commitment, optimal fiscal announcements are unbiased forecasts of...