By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into unionized mixed duopolies, this paper investigates how the preference can change the government's choice of tax regimes between ad valorem and specific taxes. Main results are as follows. Given that one of the tax regimes is...

We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on the degree of...

This paper establishes a link between the extent of collective bargaining and the degree of productivity dispersion within an industry. In a unionised oligopoly model we show that for only small differences in productivity levels. a sector-union can design a collective wage contract that covers...

We study sequential bargaining between two unions and a single firm. Parties bargain bilaterally and efficiently (over wage and employment). The unions' workforces can be substitutable ("tariff competition") or complementary ("tariff plurality" or "craft unionism"). If unions are substitutable,...

In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyze how wage setting and firm location are influenced by trade liberalization. We show that trade liberalization can induce FDI, which is at odds with conventional theoretical wisdom and cannot happen in a...

In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyze how wage setting and firm location are influenced by trade liberalization. We show that trade liberalization can induce FDI, which is at odds with conventional theoretical wisdom and cannot happen in a...

This paper establishes a link between the extent of collective bargaining and the degree of productivity dispersion within an industry. In a unionised oligopoly model we show that for only small differences in productivity levels. a sector-union can design a collective wage contract that covers...

We study sequential bargaining between two unions and a single firm. Parties bargain bilaterally and efficiently (over wage and employment). The unions' workforces can be substitutable ("tariff competition") or complementary ("tariff plurality" or "craft unionism"). If unions are substitutable,...

In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyze how wage setting and firm location are influenced by trade liberalization. We show that trade liberalization can induce FDI, which is at odds with conventional theoretical wisdom and cannot happen in a...