information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the …Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the … theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained by positing that cooperators can punish …

cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where … antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing … punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as …

to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete removal of antisocial punishment … systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be … preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …

to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete removal of antisocial punishment … preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges …. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized …

mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has … revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment … itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment …

pillar is internalised norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the … motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish … inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere …

pillar is internalized norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the … motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish … inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere …

punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels …This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide … because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment …