A stream of research examining the effect of punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead … enforcement, enabling agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of punishment legitimacy by shedding light upon … the importance of social norms and their interplay with punishment. People are often presented with incomplete norm …

enforcement mechanisms of punishment and norms cannot achieve higher cooperation rates. In fact, conformity is significantly …, when cooperation is expensive we find that the combination of punishment and empirical information about others conformity …A stream of research examining the effect of punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead …

conventional coordination, where subjects bet on only one alternative, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This … coordination. The data confirms the theoretical predictions regarding coordination behavior and demonstrates that the proposed … ordinary coordination. Finally, we point to the possibility to use the mechanism as a simple and direct tool to measure the …

findings corroborate that coordination games are a valid tool to elicit social norm perception on the subject level, as the … individuals' coordination choices are good predictors for their actual behavior. Third, average descriptive norms on the … norms using coordination games is a potentially powerful tool to predict behavior in settings that are otherwise difficult …

cooperation and sanctioning', 2007, KritV - Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, 90, 1-2, 140 … them concerns the question of “who punishes”. In the first approach, punishment is executed by the group members themselves … individually, i.e., punishment is decentral in nature. The second approach is based on the idea that individuals may be willing to …

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In … endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation …