When risks are interdependent, an agent’s decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilities faced by others. Due to these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred on...

This Paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. The consequences of capital market liberalization to national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting inefficiencies are analysed. A...

We study the international monetary policy design problem within an optimizing two-country sticky price model, where each country faces a short run trade-off between output and inflation. The model is sufficiently tractable to solve analytically. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, the policy...

The paper formulates a model of wage determination in which the firm decides on employment after a monopoly union has determined wages. The novelty is to incorporate investment and capital decisions by firms. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and its comparative statics for wages, capital...

Project risk management, as a subjective and dynamic decision method of avoiding project risk, plays an important role in selecting appropriate control measures (i.e. measure set) to handle multiple emerging risks (i.e. risk set). This paper focuses on the multi-risk control problem under the...

The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is described. Strategic game, Bayesian games, extensive games with perfect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium,...

In standard models dealing with liability rules, generally, the proportion of accident loss a party is required to bear does not depend upon the 'causation' - the extent to which the care or lack of care on the part of the party contributed to the loss. As a matter of legal doctrine, this...