We study the impact of unobservable replacements on the sustainability of reputation effects in frequently repeated games played by a long run player facing a sequence of short run players. At the beginning of every period the long-run player is replaced with a new long run player with...

We study the impact of unobservable replacements on the sustainability of reputation effects in frequently repeated games played by a long run player facing a sequence of short run players. At the beginning of every period the long-run player is replaced with a new long run player with...

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite-horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. Our main contribution is to show that communication in this dynamic environment is drastically different...

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment is drastically different from in a one-shot game. Our...