The current literature on sharing contracts emphasizes the importance of asymmetric information and typically assumes that one party is risk neutral while the other is risk averse. This paper describes a real-world contract that is widely used - the movie exhibition contract - and argues that...

This paper provides theoretical explanations for devices that movie distributors use to avoid head-to-head competition. We use a simple static model to show how revenuse sharing exhibition contracts providex multiplex owners with incentives to take cross effects on demand into account. Then we...

The current literature on sharing contracts emphasizes the importance of asymmetric information and typically assumes that one party is risk neutral while the other is risk averse. This paper describes a real-world contract that is widely used - the movie exhibition contract - and argues that...

The current literature on sharing contracts emphasizes the importance of asymmetric information and typically assumes that one party is risk neutral while the other is risk averse. This paper describes a real-world contract that is widely used - the movie exhibition contract - and argues that...

This paper provides theoretical explanations for devices that movie distributors use to avoid head-to-head competition. We use a simple static model to show how revenuse sharing exhibition contracts providex multiplex owners with incentives to take cross effects on demand into account. Then we...