This article examines behavior in two-person constant-sum Colonel Blotto games in which each player maximizes the expected total value of the battlefields won. A lottery contest success function is employed in each battlefield. Recent experimental research on such games provides only partial...

We consider a large class of 2-contestant Colonel Blotto games, for which the budget and valuation are both asymmetric between players and the contest success functions are in Tullock form with battle-specific discriminatory power in (0, 1] and battle-and-contestant-specific lobbying...

We consider a large class of 2-contestant Colonel Blotto games, for which the budget and valuation are both asymmetric between players and the contest success functions are in Tullock form with battle-specific discriminatory power in (0, 1] and battle-and-contestant-specific lobbying...

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.