Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this … paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available … alternatives on individuals' mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we …

Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this … paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available … alternatives on individuals' mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we …

. Remaining (sophisticated) agents lie strategically and approximately apply their optimal decision rule. …

We study decision rules for committees that repeatedly take a binary decision. Committee members are privately informed … about their payoffs and monetary transfers are not feasible. In static environments, the only strategy-proof mechanisms are … structure of repeated decision-making allows for richer decision rules that overcome this inefficiency by making use of …

. Remaining (sophisticated) agents lie strategically and approximately apply their optimal decision rule …