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Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents

Bade, Sophie - 2010

preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so … in any which way to obtain results on the welfare properties of trade. Secondly, some matching allocation mechanisms have … rationalizable. These results remain valid when restricting attention to \minimally irrational" behavior. -- Bounded Rationality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008779117

Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange

Bade, Sophie - In: Social choice and welfare 42 (2014) 2, pp. 279-287

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260003

Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange

Bade, Sophie - 2011

A version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that applies to a money-free environment, in which a set of indivisible goods needs to be matched to some set of agents, is established. In such environments, "trade" can be identified with the set of hierarchical exchange...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122771

Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange

Bade, Sophie - 2011

A version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that applies to a money-free environment, in which a set of indivisible goods needs to be matched to some set of agents, is established. In such environments, 'trade' can be identified with the set of hierarchical exchange...