We consider extensive-form games in which the information structure is not known and ask how much of that structure can be inferred from the distribution on action profiles generated by player strategies. One game is said to observationally imitate another when the distribution on action...

This paper develops a discrete-time general equilibrium model of insurance using standard techniques of intertemporal finance. The underlying source of uncertainty is modeled as a marked point process. The paper begins by characterizing Walrasian equilibrium on the event tree generated by the...

When tort and insurance (both private and social) co-exist, coordination mechanisms are very relevant. Imperfect liability rules provide the setting to properly analyze the incentives that the coordination mechanisms induce for risk coverage and for precaution...

El mercado de la prostitución ha sido históricamente y es en la actualidad objeto de una amplia y variada gama de tratamientos legales. La literatura económica ha explorado la naturaleza de las decisiones de oferta y demanda en este mercado, tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como...

We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assuming that the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as due care the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth of the...

The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims have heterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information,efficient care by the injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observe at all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts,...