We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an … bribes to some division managers. And because headquarters is itself an agent of outside investors, the bribes may take the …

We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an … bribes to some division managers. And because headquarters is itself an agent of outside investors, the bribes may take the …

We argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers' decisions: In general, managerial rent-seeking affects not … managerial discretion, managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income. Any managerial contract is …

This study examines the role of managers’ political campaign contributions in relation to their firms’ tax benefits … firm. Using a major tax law change, we find that firms’ political action committee contributions and individual managers … contributions to be an increasing function of managers’ wealth effects through the existence of bonus plans that are based on after …