Development of human societies requires cooperation among unrelated individuals and obedience to social norms. Although punishment is widely agreed to be potentially useful in fostering cooperation, many recent results in psychology and economics highlight punishments' failures in this regard....

By the well established tournament literature, incomplete information regarding the employees’ productivity is essential for the rationalization of (efficiency-enhancing) tournaments. In this paper we propose an alternative rationalization of tournaments focusing on a fully informed principal...

Labor market discrimination and racial segregation can be viewed as part of a more general tendency for residents of a community to limit the community's size or its factor-ownership composition. Statutory segregation is motivated not only by racial prejudice, but also by a desire to maximize...

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with...

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over...

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to...

A parameterized characterization of height-based total extensions of Principal filtral opportunity rankings is provided and shown to include as a special case a version of the well-known Pattanaik-Xu characterization of the cardinality-based ranking.

Collective Identification Procedures (CIPs) model admission rules regulating membership in associations, communities and clubs: the Libertarian identification rule Fl is the CIP which essentially relies on self-certification. This paper studies Fl in an arbitrary finite atomistic lattice,...

This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the re vealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets, the exercice is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994).

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.