while children's altruism is not. The traditional topping up and opting out policies are special cases of ours. Both total … and informal care should increase with the children's level of altruism. This obtains under full and asymmetric … explained by the need to provide incentives to high-altruism children. The implementing contract is always such that social care …

We study the role and design of private and public insurance programs when informal care is uncertain. Children …’s degree of altruism is randomly distributed over some interval. Social insurance helps parents who receive a low level of care …

while children’s altruism is not. The traditional topping up and opting out policies are special cases of ours. Both total … and informal care should increase with the children’s level of altruism. This obtains under full and asymmetric … explained by the need to provide incentives to high-altruism children. The implementing contract is always such that social care …

observe their children's cost of providing care, which is continuously distributed over some interval. They choose a rule … sum of parents' and children's utility. The optimal uniform public LTC insurance can fully cover the risk of dependence … but parents continue to bear the risk of having children with a high cost of providing care. A nonlinear policy …

observe their children's cost of providing care, which is continuously distributed over some interval. They choose a rule … sum of parents' and children's utility. The optimal uniform public LTC insurance can fully cover the risk of dependence … but parents continue to bear the risk of having children with a high cost of providing care. A nonlinear policy …