This paper examines the hypothesis that firms in competitive industries should benefit relatively less from good governance, while firms in non-competitive industries - where lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers - should benefit relatively more. Whether we look at...

This paper shows that buildups in firm leverage predict subsequent declines in aggregate regional employment. Using confidential establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we exploit regional heterogeneity in leverage buildups by large U.S. publicly listed firms, which are widely...

We propose a tractable model of dynamic investment, division sales (spinoffs), financing, and risk management for a multi-division firm that faces costly external finance. The model highlights the importance of considering the intertwined nature of the different policies. Our main results are as...

Using a sample of highly (over-)leveraged Austrian ski hotels undergoing debt restructurings, we show that reducing a debt overhang leads to a significant improvement in operating performance (return on assets, net profit margin). In particular, a reduction in leverage leads to a decrease in...

By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a...

Using Census microdata on multi-state firms, we estimate the impact of state taxes on business activity. For C corporations, employment and the number of establishments have corporate tax elasticities of -0.4, and do not vary with changes in personal tax rates. Pass-through entity activities...