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In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321813
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342576
In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771032
This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325424
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001551633
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out that the core … social choice and game theory, such as the Condorcet winner, the Nash equilibrium, pairwise stability, and stable matchings …, among others. Our characterization of the core invokes the axioms of restricted non-emptiness, coalitional unanimity, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911351
This work aims to provide different perspectives on the relationships between cooperative game theory and the research …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547760
in the coalition. Unlike in the MCST model we show that the core of the induced cost game in the MCCN model can be empty … (without introducing Steiner nodes). We therefore consider sufficient conditions for non-empty core. Theorem 1 shows that when … the efficient network and the demand graph consist of the same components, the induced cost game has non-empty core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012242132
sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets … cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082
The concept of 'the core' originates in cooperative game theory and its introduction to economics in the 1960s as a …. However, use of the core eventually waned and the concept faded into the backdrop of economic theory. This paper makes use of … basis for proofs of existence of general equilibrium is one of the earliest attempts to use game theory to address big …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012100909