Larger firms (by sales or employment) have higher leverage. This pattern is explained using a model in which firms produce multiple varieties and borrow with the option to default against their future cash flow. A variety can die with a constant probability, implying that bigger firms (those...

We present a novel and tractable model of long-term sovereign debt. We make two sets of contributions. First, on the substantive side, using Argentina as a test case we show that unlike one-period debt models, our model of long-term sovereign debt is capable of accounting for the average spread,...

A sovereign's inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long-term debt costly (the problem of debt dilution). One mechanism to mitigate the debt dilution problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in sovereign debt contracts. In the event...

We present a model of long-duration collateralized debt with risk of default. Applied to the housing market, it can match the homeownership rate, the average foreclosure rate, and the lower tail of the distribution of home-equity ratios across homeowners prior to the recent crisis. We stress the...

What implications does land supply elasticity have for land price appreciation in cities that are experiencing population or productivity growth? In the setting of a circular city model with a production externality, we show that residential land prices grow faster in the city that can expand...

gain on housing leads to offsetting movements in downpayments, with little or no change in equilibrium default frequency.

future (so-called debt dilution problem).

We construct a quantitative equilibrium model that accounts for the salient features of the US housing market, namely, the homeownership rate, the average foreclosure rate prior to the crisis and the distribution of home-equity ratios across homeowners. Given this steady state, we examine the...

An important source of inefficiency in long-term debt contracts is the debt dilution problem, wherein a borrower ignores the adverse impact of new borrowing on the market value of outstanding debt and, therefore, borrows too much and defaults too frequently. A commonly proposed remedy to the...

We evaluate the welfare benefits of international bankruptcy regimes in a political economy model of debt and default. We show that the socially optimal bankruptcy regime is likely to feature lower restructuring costs than the politically optimal bankruptcy regime. To the extent the current...