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Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance : experimental evidence

Bó, Inácio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2016

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574107

The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism

Bó, Inácio Guerberoff Lanari; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2016

We introduce a new mechanism for matching students to schools or universities, denoted Iterative Deferred Acceptance …), the matching that is produced is the Student Optimal Stable Matching. Moreover, under imperfect information, students …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586814

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence

Bó, Inácio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2016

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574203

Chapter 17. Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources

Snmez, Tayfun; Utku nver, M. - In: Handbook of social economics : volume 1, (pp. 781-852). 2011

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025686

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Bó, Inácio; Heller, C.-Philipp - 2016

We show that Ergin & Sönmez's (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473711