Dynamic consistency leads to Bayesian updating under expected utility. We ask what it implies for the updating of more … characterize dynamically consistent updating for two important models of ambiguity averse preferences: the ambiguity averse smooth … ambiguity aversion. This characterization extends to regret-based models as well. As an application of our general result, we …

Dynamic consistency leads to Bayesian updating under expected utility. We ask what it implies for the updating of more … characterize dynamically consistent updating for two important models of ambiguity averse preferences: the ambiguity averse smooth … ambiguity aversion. This characterization extends to regret-based models as well. As an appli- cation of our general result, we …

of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg …We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity …’s paradox) with dynamic consistency for all non-null events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes’ rule to subsets of the …

of preferences over acts, to be able to reconcile typical behavior in the face of ambiguity (as exemplified by Ellsberg …We propose and axiomatically characterize dynamically consistent update rules for decision making under ambiguity …’s paradox) with dynamic consistency for all non-null events. Updating takes the form of applying Bayes’ rule to subsets of the …

Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin … consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects. …

dated preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg …

Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin … consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects. …

preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color …

preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color …

preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color …