We study chip-strategy equilibria in two-player repeated games. Intuitively, in these equilibria players exchange favors by taking individually suboptimal actions if these actions create a "gain" for the opponent larger than the player's "loss" from taking them. In exchange, the player who...

This paper studies a model in which in period 1, a decision-maker chooses a set of lotteries and in period 2, Nature chooses a lottery from the set chosen by the decision-maker and the decision-maker consumes the lottery chosen by Nature. Larger sets are interpreted as representing more...

Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any rules of thumb regarding how we should argue in debates? We suggest a framework for normative analysis of debates. In our framework, each discussant wants the audience to believe that the actual state coincides with the discussant's...

I survey and discuss the recent literature on testing experts or probabilistic forecasts, which I would describe as a literature on “strategic hypothesis testing†The starting point of this literature is some surprising results of the following type: suppose that a criterion forjudging...

This paper studies a model in which in period 1, a decision-maker chooses a set of lotteries and in period 2, Nature chooses a lottery from the set chosen by the decision-maker and the decision-maker consumes the lottery chosen by Nature. Larger sets are interpreted as representing more...

A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public...

I consider two player games, where player 1 can use only pure strategies, and player 2 can use mixed strategies. I indicate a class of such games with the property that under public randomization both the discounted and the undiscounted finitely repeated perfect folk theorems do hold, but the...

Political processes may bring about Pareto improvements by increasing income inequality in a society that produces a public good by voluntary contributions. Proportional taxation funds a "governing agent." The most endowed agent is the Condorcet winner for governing agent. When the tax rate can...

We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his...